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Comment
Mention of Defendant's Liability
Insurance in the Presence of a Jury
I. INTRODUCTION
Lawyers use every available means to persuade juries to find
for their clients. This comment deals with one aspect of negligence
practice-attempts by a plaintiff's attorney to introduce evidence of
a defendant's liability insurance. The plaintiff's attorney may
attempt to introduce such evidence in the belief that a jury's
knowledge of a defendant's coverage will make it easier for the
jury to find liability and to make damages larger than it otherwise
would.
A general rule prohibits references to the defendant's liability
insurance.' Although the general rule is basically sound, there
are instances in which it must give way to overriding considera-
tions. Unfortunately, many courts' delineations of the exceptions,
because of the imprecision with which they are stated and the im-
proper manner in which they are applied, have done more harm
than good. The general rule should be scrutinized, and the excep-
tions stated and applied in such a manner as to allow deserving
plaintiffs to prove their cases. What is required is a definitive
statement as to what the exceptions should be and how they should
be applied.
Generally, information about liability insurance coverage is ad-
mitted (1) when the fact of insurance is relevant to a disputed
issue; (2) when the fact of insurance is relevant to the credibility of
a witness; (3) when an integral part of an admission by the de-
fendant alludes to the fact of insurance; (4) when the fact of in-
surance is elicited unintentionally or by way of a witness's voluntary
or unresponsive answer; (5) when counsel in good faith on voir dire
questions prospective jurors with respect to their insurance compa-
nies; and (6) when the courts have adopted miscellaneous excep-
tions.
2
1. Barrett v. Bonham Oil & Cotton Co., 57 S.W. 602, 603 (Tex. Civ. App.
1900); McCoRMICK's HANDBOOK oF THE LAw oF EVIDENCE § 201 (2d
ed., E. Cleary 1972) [hereinafter cited as McCoamvcK].
2. These exceptions will be used for purposes of illustration only. This
comment does not discuss the situation in which the defendant, in
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II. WHEN THE FACT OF INSURANCE IS
RELEVANT TO A DISPUTED ISSUE
One of the primary exceptions to the rule forbidding disclosure
of the defendant's liability insurance is applied when the existence
of that insurance is relevant to some disputed issue.3 A common
example of this exception is when the plaintiff introduces evidence
of the defendant's insurance covering the party whose alleged neg-
ligence caused the plaintiff's injury, and who allegedly is an agent
or employee of the defendant. Here, where the defendant disclaims
liability for the negligent individual's conduct, rules4 and statutes5
provide that evidence of insurance coverage of the negligent
operator is relevant and hence admissible to show that the dis-
puted relationship does exist. This evidence derives its probative
value from the fact that one generally does not take out liability
insurance for the acts of another unless he believes that he may be
liable for the negligent acts of the other.6
The apparent purpose of this exception is to assist the injured
plaintiff in fastening liability on a solvent defendant who denies
responsibility for the injury-producing act. This desire to find a
solvent defendant conflicts with the defendant's need to keep pre-
judicial information from the jury. It is frequently the defendant's
contention that any reference to insurance, no matter how oblique,
is so prejudicial that he cannot obtain a fair trial.
To a large extent, the defendant's arguments lack persuasiveness
because insurance coverage is so common today that many jurors
assume that it is involved.7 In addition, there are several other
ways in which the plaintiff can directly or indirectly inform the
jury of the defendant's coverage.8
order to show that the plaintiff is malingering, seeks to reveal the
existence of the plaintiffs insurance, although the discussions deal-
ing with relevance, prejudice, and probative value may be of value
to the lawyer confronted with that situation.
3. McCoRMICK § 201, at 480; Note, Insurance as Evidence, 16 SYmRcus.
L. REv. 92, 95 (1964); see FED. R. Evm. 411; NEE. REv. STAT. § 27-411
(Reissue 1975).
4. E.g., FF.. R. Evm. 411.
5. E.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-411 (Reissue 1975).
6. Biggins v. Wagner, 60 S.D. 581, 585, 245 N.W. 385, 387 (1932).
7. By 1959, 83% of the motorists in 28 states had liability insur-
ance coverage. Ames, The Auto Accident Commission Proposal: An
Irrational Concept, 14 U. FLA. L. REV. 398, 400 (1962). This figure
does not include New York and Massachusetts, which had compul-
sory insurance. The percentage of motorists carrying liability insur-
ance is no doubt much higher today.
8. MCCORMCK § 201, at 481; Annot., 4 A.L.R.2d 761, § 2 (1949); Note,
supra note 3, at 93-95.
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This particular exception to the nondisclosure rule should be
expanded to admit evidence of the defendant's liability insurance
whenever it is relevant to any disputed issue.9 The traditional ap-
proach limits the exception to disputed agency, ownership, and con-
trol issues. 10 Thus, it excludes evidence of insurance needed to
prove, for example, that the negligent operator of the injury-pro-
ducing instrument was acting with (or without) the permission,
consent, or authorization of the defendant." Furthermore, this ex-
ception, if broadened to allow the admission of evidence of the
defendant's liability insurance whenever it is relevant to a disputed
issue, would place it in harmony with modern tort principles in
that it would aid the plaintiff in fastening liability on a solvent de-
fendant.12 Under the proposed rule,'3 employed with the proper
safeguards, any prejudice created by evidence revealing a de-
fendant's insurance coverage would be counterbalanced by the
probative force of the evidence.'
4
The most important safeguard needed is a requirement that prof-
fered evidence meet a certain standard of relevance. That standard
should, at a minimum, place two requirements on the admission of
evidence: first, that the issue actually be in dispute, and second,
that the evidence tend to resolve or prove the issue.' 5 Where the
9. In Robinson v. Hill, 60 Wash. 615, 111 P. 871 (1910), the Supreme
Court of Washington held that the rule of nondisclosure will be
relaxed when it can be shown that the person disclaiming liability
secured the insurance to protect himself against "the very thing
which had happened." Id. at 618, Ill P. at 871. For another expan-
sion of the exception see Leotta v. Plessinger, 8 N.Y.2d 449, 461-62,
171 N.E.2d 454, 460, 209 N.Y.S.2d 304, 313 (1960). See also Biggins
v. Wagner, 60 S.D. 581, 586-87, 245 N.W. 385, 387 (1932).
10. Note, supra note 3, at 95-96; Pagano v. Leisner, 5 IlM. App. 2d 223,
228, 125 N.E.2d 301, 303 (1955); Van Drake v. Thomas, 110 Ind. App.
586, 600-01, 38 N.E.2d 878, 883 (1942).
11. See Leotta v. Plessinger, 8 N.Y.2d 449, 171 N.E.2d 454, 209 N.Y.S.2d
304 (1960).
12. See W. PRossER, THE LAW OF TORTS (4th ed. 1971), in which the
author notes the "strong and growing tendency, where there is blame
on neither side, to ask, in view of the exigencies of social justice,
who can best bear the loss and hence to shift the loss by creating
liability where there has been no fault." Id. § 75, at 494.
13. In this comment, "rule" and "exception" are used interchangeably.
In number and importance, the exceptions have virtually attained
the status of rules.
When used, the terms "general rule" and "nondisclosure rule"
refer to the rule barring the introduction of evidence of a defendant's
liability coverage.
14. See FsD. R. EviD. 401, 403; NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 27-401, -403 (Reissue
1975).
15. FED. R. EviD. 401 and NE. REv. STAT. § 27-401 (Reissue 1975) provide:
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issue or relationship has already been admitted, or established,
evidence of the defendant's liability insurance is not admissible to
prove such an issue or relationship.' Also, when the defense so
requests, the court should promptly instruct the jury that the evi-
dence of the defendant's insurance should be considered only with
respect to whether or not the disputed relationship exists, and
should not be considered as evidence of the actor's negligence.
17
The attorney of the party supposedly harmed by the introduction
of evidence of insurance should be able to prevent the court from
giving any such instruction if he believes that the limiting instruc-
tion may only serve to reinforce in the minds of the jurors the fact
that the defendant has insurance coverage.
Although there is no Nebraska case law directly on point, it
is clear from analogous cases' s that Nebraska follows the pro-
posed rule and its accompanying safeguards. The specific mention
in the Nebraska statutes' 9 of the agency, ownership, and control
exceptions should not be construed as limiting the Nebraska rule
to those exceptions. Rather, the words of the statute, when read
Relevant evidence means evidence having any tendency to
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable
than it would be without the evidence.
Some courts apply a very low threshold of admissibility. In Van
Drake v. Thomas, 110 Ind. App. 586, 38 N.E.2d 878 (1942), the court
stated: "[T]he fact that such evidence [of insurance] may have but
a slight bearing upon the issue does not render it incompetent but
merely affects its weight." Id. at 601, 38 N.E.2d at 883. The fault
in this standard is that it permits the admission of any statement
containing a reference to insurance, no matter how lacking in pro-
bative value, so long as the statement meets the nebulous "slight
bearing" standard. It is submitted that the better test is that of
whether the evidence tends to resolve an issue. See Muckenthaler v.
Ehinger, 409 S.W.2d 625, 628 (Mo. 1966). Though this standard is
vague, it is a significant improvement over the Van Drake standard,
and it is in basic agreement with the Federal and Nebraska rules
quoted above.
16. Dabney v. Yapa, 187 So. 2d 381, 384 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966); Griffin
v. Church of the Assumption, 14 App. Div. 2d 620, 621, 218 N.Y.S.2d
141, 142-43 (1961).
17. FED. R. Evm_. 411 and NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-411 (Reissue 1975) provide:
"Evidence that a person was or was not insured against liability is
not admissible upon the issue whether he acted negligently or other-
wise wrongfully .... .
18. Neill v. McGinn, 175 Neb. 369, 122 N.W.2d 65 (1963); Fielding v.
Publix Cars, Inc., 130 Neb. 576, 265 N.W. 726 (1936).
19. NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-411 (Reissue 1975) provides in part:
This rule does not require the exclusion of evidence of insur-
ance against liability when offered for another purpose, such
as proof of agency, ownership, or control, or bias or prejudice
of a witness.
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carefully and in conjunction with the relevant case law, 20 must be
construed as words of illustration. So interpreted, the Nebraska
rule is in accord with the proposed rule, and would admit evidence
of the defendant's insurance coverage whenever it would tend to
resolve a disputed issue.
III. WHEN THE FACT OF INSURANCE IS RELEVANT
TO THE CREDIBILITY OF A WITNESS
Evidence of insurance coverage is also commonly admitted when
the fact of insurance is relevant to the credibility of a witness. 21
This problem may arise when the witness has some interest in the
defendant's insurance company, usually pecuniary, which may in-
fluence his testimony. Where a witness has such an interest,
courts generally have allowed the other party to reveal it so that the
jury may more accurately ascertain the weight to give his testi-
mony.22 Here, the competing interests are (1) the plaintiff's in-
terest in reducing the weight given to the testimony of an adverse
witness by showing his potential for bias, and (2) the defendant's
interest in keeping from the jury irrelevant and prejudicial in-
formation.
In this area, there are two lines of cases. The better, but
minority, rule allows the plaintiff to show only that the adverse
witness has an interest in or is employed on behalf of the de-
fendant.23 The majority rule allows the plaintiff to show that the
witness has an interest in or is employed by a named insurance
company that is the insurer of the defendant. 24 Under the major-
ity's version of the rule, a showing of the defendant's insurance
coverage is permissible so long as the evidence is not introduced
for the primary purpose of prejudicing the jury.25
20. Fielding v. Publix Cars, Inc., 130 Neb. 576, 265 N.W. 726 (1936).
21. See FED. R. Evm. 411; NEB. REv. STAT. § 27-411 (Reissue 1975); Note,
Evidence: Proper Disclosure During Trial That Defendant Is Insured,
26 CoRNEiL L.Q. 137, 138 (1940).
22. McCoimrcK § 201, at 480; see Pickett v. Kolb, 250 Ind. 449, 237 N.E.2d
105 (1968) (error for trial court to exclude evidence that would have
revealed that the defendant's insurance company paid an inspector
who served as a witness at the trial).
23. Hopper v. Comfort Coal-Lumber Co., 276 App. Div. 1014, 95 N.Y.S.2d
318 (1950), modified, 218 App. Div. 1007, 105 N.Y.S.2d 874 (1951).
See also O'Donnell v. Bachelor, 429 Pa. 498, 505-06, 240 A.2d 484, 487
(1968) (dissenting opinion).
24. Williams v. Matlin, 328 Il. App. 645, 647, 66 N.E.2d 719, 720 (1946);
Di Tommaso v. Syracuse Univ., 172 App. Div. 34, 36, 158 N.Y.S. 175,
177, aff'd, 218 N.Y. 640, 112 N.E. 1057 (1916).
25. 172 App. Div. at 36, 158 N.Y.S. at 176.
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An incisive statement concerning this exception is found in
O'Donnell v. Bachelor,26 where the plaintiff brought an action for
personal injuries suffered as a result of being struck by the defend-
ant. In an attempt to show the bias of an employee of the defend-
ant's insurer, the trial court permitted the plaintiff's counsel to
establish only that he was employed by an attorney whose interest
in the matter was not disclosed. In reversing the trial court, the
appellate court stated that "[o] nce a witness commits himself to the
ocean of legal controversy, he must, under cross-examination, dis-
close the flag under which he sails." 2 7 To this, the dissent responded
that such a revelation discloses "not only the flag but the seamstress
who sewed it."
'28
It is submitted that the minority rule and the dissent in
O'Donnell represent the better view. Under this view, the plain-
tiff has a chance to show that the agent is employed by or on behalf
of the defendant, and thus that the agent is biased. The plaintiff's
interest in showing bias is not furthered by permitting him to show
that the witness is an employee of the defendant's insurer. Once
this additional fact is disclosed, its sole effect is to prejudice the
defendant's case. Furthermore, use of the majority rule necessitates
a determination by the court of whether or not the plaintiff's intro-
duction of the defendant's insurance coverage was done for the
purpose of prejudicing the jury.
2 9
If the majority rule is retained, a court should, upon the de-
fendant's request, instruct the jury that the insurance coverage is
not to be considered in its determination of the defendant's negli-
gence, but is relevant only for the purpose of evaluating the defense
witness's credibility. 0 Some courts have held that it is reversible
error for the plaintiff to fail to strike the objectionable matter and
request that the court admonish the jury.8 1 This portion of the
rule is objectionable, because the defendant may feel that he is
harmed less by ignoring the reference to insurance than by the
request to strike and admonish.
Nebraska follows the majority rule. It permits a full-blown
cross-examination of defense witnesses, and thus allows the plain-
tiff to unnecessarily disclose the fact of the defendant's insurance
26. 429 Pa. 498, 240 A.2d 484 (1968).
27. Id. at 502, 240 A.2d at 486.
28. Id. at 509, 240 A.2d at 489 (dissenting opinion).
29. See Di Tommaso v. Syracuse Univ., 172 App. Div. 34, 36, 158 N.Y.S.
175, 176, af'd, 218 N.Y. 640, 112 N.E. 1057 (1916).
30. Note, supra note 3, at 94.
31. E.g., Toombs v. Texas Oil Co., 145 Misc. 762, 764, 260 N.Y.S. 773, 775
(New York City Ct. 1932).
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coverage. One of the few Nebraska cases dealing specifically with
this second exception is Lyons v. Joseph.3 2 In Lyons, the court
held permissible the cross-examination of the defendant's expert
witness regarding his employment by the defendant's insurer. In
a similar case, the Nebraska supreme court, in Gleason v. Baack,33
held that the admission of evidence of insurance was not error
where the defendant attempted to impeach the witness with a
statement he had made to an insurance agent. In so holding, the
court cited cases that relied on the interest of the plaintiff in
refuting an attack on his credibility by showing all relations of the
adverse witness which tended to show the witness's interest or
bias.
The rule followed by Nebraska results in unfair and unnecessary
prejudice to the defendant. To adequately protect the plaintiff's
interest, it is necessary to show only the flag- under which the wit-
ness sails, i.e., that he is employed on behalf of the defendant. To
go beyond this and show that the witness is engaged by an in-
surance company, particularly a named company, is to inject
irrelevant and prejudicial matters into evidence.
IV. WHEN AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE ADMISSION
BY THE DEFENDANT ALLUDES TO THE FACT
OF THE DEFENDANT'S INSURANCE COVERAGE
A third exception to the general rule of nondisclosure applies
when a defendant makes a statement amounting to an admission of
liability that also tends to apprise the jury of the fact that the
defendant is covered by insurance. Such statements are generally
admissible in their entirety.3 4 They are not admitted to allow a
plaintiff to prove the fact of the defendant's coverage, but rather
because the reference to insurance is part of the admission. 5
This particular exception needs clarification because present
guidelines are often unclear or ignored. Illustrative is Reid V.
Owens,36 in which the Utah supreme court set down this apparently
clear rule:
Though references to insurance be made in connection with an
admission of liability, unless the reference to insurance is itself
32. 124 Neb. 442, 246 N.W. 859 (1933).
33. 137 Neb. 272, 289 N.W. 349 (1939).
34. See, e.g., Flieg v. Levy, 148 App. Div. 781, 783, 133 N.Y.S. 249, 250-51
(1912), ajf'd, 208 N.Y. 564, 101 N.E. 1102 (1913).
35. Dillon v. Wallace, 148 Cal. App. 2d 447, 452, 306 P.2d 1044, 1046 (1st
Dist. 1957); Hanke v. Burns, 140 Cal. App. 2d 158, 167, 294 P.2d 1008,
1013 (4th Dist. 1956).
36. 98 Utah 50, 93 P.2d 680 (1939).
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freighted with admission, counsel should be required to so elicit
the testimony as to preclude revelation of the irrelevant fact.
3 7
The plaintiff was permitted to introduce, in a suit for negligent en-
trustment against the automobile operator's father, the following
statements: "My boy is careless, and he drives too fast and it
worries us. . . . We have taken out insurance to protect him
. "... 3, Although the rule was well stated, it was grossly mis-
applied when the court used it to let in the second statement that
had the sole purpose and effect of prejudicing the case against the
defendant. Reid indicates a need for a more refined rule.
Although the courts often articulate what seem to be acceptable
rules,39 something more analytical is required to achieve fair and
consistent results in the various situations in which this issue
presents itself. The most definitive and preferable version of this
exception would require (1) that the statement containing a
reference to insurance be in fact an admission of fault; (2) that the
statement have a direct bearing on a disputed issue; and (3) that
the word "insurance" be so interwoven in the admission that it
would be impracticable to remove it.
By admission of fault it is meant that the statement must, at
a minimum, contain an inference adverse to defendant's claim of
non-negligence.4 0 The second requirement contemplates two con-
ditions: the statement must (1) have a direct bearing on (2) a
disputed issue. The direct-bearing condition would be satisfied by
any statement, the introduction of which makes the existence of any
fact more or less probable than it would have been without the
evidence.41 The disputed-issue requirement demands that the
issue be one that has not been conceded or otherwise established.
The third requirement can be satisfied by excising the objectionable
part of the admission if that may be done without damaging the
probative force of the admission.
42
This proposed rule provides concrete guidelines that would, if
adopted, promote more certainty and consistency of result than
heretofore realized. In close cases, the evidence should be ad-
37. Id. at 61, 93 P.2d at 685.
38. Id. at 60, 93 P.2d at 685.
39. See id.
40. Layton v. Knight, 129 Ga. App. 113, 113-14, 198 S.E.2d 915, 916-17
(1973); Watkins v. Williamson, 132 Mont. 46, 50, 314 P.2d 872, 875
(1957).
41. See FED. R. Evi-. 401; NEB. REv. STAT. § 27-401 (Reissue 1975).
42. Reid v. Owens, 98 Utah 50, 60, 93 P.2d 680, 685 (1939).
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mitted.43 This proposed rule is justified, at least in part, by the
notion that a party should not be denied the opportunity to prove
his case merely because an admission of fault contains an incidental
reference to insurance. The defendant should have the option of
requesting-or not requesting-a limiting instruction from the
bench.
With regard to this third exception to the general rule of non-
disclosure, there appears to be no Nebraska law on point. It is
submitted that Nebraska should adopt the three-point test as set
out above. This proposed rule achieves the purpose of the ex-
ception, while reconciling the conflicting considerations. It does
not preclude deserving plaintiffs from proving their cases merely
because an admission of fault contains an incidental reference to
the defendant's insurance coverage.
V. WHEN THE FACT OF INSURANCE IS ELICITED
UNINTENTIONALLY OR THE WITNESS GIVES
A VOLUNTARY OR UNRESPONSIVE ANSWER
When the fact of insurance is elicited unintentionally or a witness
gives a voluntary or unresponsive answer, another important ex-
ception to the general rule of nondisclosure arises. The weight
of authority in this area holds that if the plaintiff's counsel asks a
question which calls for an admissible answer, the fact that the
witness inadvertently or unresponsively refers to insurance will
not be grounds for sustaining a motion for mistrial.44
The competing considerations here are the plaintiff's interest in
a final adjudication in the matter without unreasonable delay and
expense, and the defendant's interest in obtaining a verdict not
unduly influenced by avoidable prejudice.
There are four common settings in which this exception may
arise: where the fact of insurance is mentioned by the plaintiff on
direct examination; where a defense witness mentions it on cross-
examination; where the plaintiff or one of his witnesses mentions
it on cross-examination; and where the defendant or one of his
witnesses mentions it on direct examination.
43. A jury's knowledge of the defendant's insurance coverage is probably
not as prejudicial as it once was. Indeed, judges often assert that the
jury is aware that the defendant is insured: "Any juror who doesn't
know there is liability insurance in the case by this time [after voir
dire] should probably be excused by virtue of the fact that he or
she is an idiot." Young v. Carter, 121 Ga. App. 191, 192, 173 S.E.2d
259, 261 (1970) (concurring opinion).
44. Annot., supra note 8, § 12.
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The latter two examples are of less importance, because the de-
fendant rarely has any motivation to reveal the fact of insurance
and hence will not attempt to do so while examining a witness. Re-
garding the more important settings, any test for determining
whether or not the plaintiff's attorney committed reversible error
must begin with an examination of his conduct. The better-rea-
soned opinions state as a basic premise that the test involves a
determination of whether or not the plaintiff's attorney's question
called for admissible evidence. 45 Thus, if it appears that the
plaintiff's injection of the element of insurance was not deliberate,
its admission may be cured by an order striking the evidence, with
prompt instructions to the jury to disregard it.46 Determining
whether or not the reference to insurance was inadvertent is, of
course, often a difficult task.
47
Although the majority of courts has condemned attempts to in-
form the jury that the defendant has insurance, this condemnation
usually extends only to cases where there is an "avowed purpose
and successful attempt ' 48 to present this fact to the jury. As a
corollary, the majority holds that the prohibition does not extend to
cases where insurance is mentioned incidentally, in the attempt to
prove other facts, or where there was no indication that the
objectionable answer was sought or anticipated.49 Even where the
objectionable answer is the result of the plaintiff's misconduct,
courts are slow to declare mistrials if opposing counsel did not
make a timely objection and the trial court could have, by proper
admonition, removed the prejudicial effect. This is so because the
litigants, and not the attorney, are made to suffer for the latter's
misconduct.50 But, if the statement is extreme in its effect, the
court, under some rules, may declare a mistrial even if no specific
objection is made.51
45. See Ernest Yeager & Sons v. Howell, 234 So. 2d 899, 901 (Miss. 1970).
See also Muehlebach v. Mercer Mortuary & Chapel, Inc., 93 Ariz. 60,
378 P.2d 741 (1963).
46. Elite Cleaners & Tailors, Inc. v. Gentry, 510 P.2d 784, 786-87 (Wyo.
1973).
47. See Lubbock Bus Co. v. Pearson, 266 S.W.2d 439, 443-47 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1953).
48. Hughes v. Quackenbush, 1 Cal. App. 2d 349, 358, 37 P.2d 99, 103 (2d
Dist. 1934); Hart v. Wielt, 4 Cal. App. 3d 224, 84 Cal. Rptr. 220 (3d
Dist. 1970); Cortesia Cadillac v. Willard A. Selle, Inc., 442 S.W.2d 925
(Tex. Civ. App. 1969).
49. See Hart v. Wielt, 4 Cal. App. 3d 224, 84 Cal. Rptr. 220 (3d Dist.
1970).
50. Id. See also NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-103 (Reissue 1975).
51. FED. R. EviD. 103; NEB. REv. STAT. § 27-103 (Reissue 1975).
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A few decisions have viewed the inadvertent mention of in-
surance in a dimmer light. In Consolidated Motors, Inc., v.
Ketcham,5" the Arizona supreme court set out the following rule:
[U]nless it appears that the plaintiff was entirely without blame
in creating the situation which caused the reference to the
question of insurance, we have always reversed the case whenever
the matter was in any way brought to the attention of the jury,
regardless of whether it came through a witness for plaintiff or
defendant, or uyon direct or cross-examination. It is not sufficient
that plaintiff did not mean to bring out the prohibited matter, but
he must mean not to.53
This standard is clearly unreasonable in placing such an
onerous burden on the plaintiff. It does nothing to reconcile the
competing interests, and it clearly does not advance the plaintiff's
interest in obtaining an econonic and speedy resolution of the
dispute. Further, this rule does not necessarily promote the in-
terests of the defendant, because where the existence of his liability
insurance has not been emphasized, there very well may be no un-
due prejudice to guard against. Some courts contend that every-
one assumes that the defendant is insured, and that the mere
mention of the defendant's liability insurance is, therefore, not
harmful.5
4
Because the proper conduct of counsel is an important considera-
tion, a mistrial generally should be declared if the plaintiff's coun-
sel in bad faith sought to inform the jury of the defendant's insur-
ance. In this area of the law, however, the trial judge must not
allow the mere mention of the world "insurance" to provoke the
conditioned response---"mistrial." 55
It is important here to distinguish the situation in which a
plaintiff's witness is under direct examination from that in which
a defense witness is under cross-examination. In the first situation,
the plaintiff has had the opportunity and the obligation to prepare
his witnesses so that they do not improperly inject insurance into
the evidence. Therefore, he should be held to a high standard of
care in keeping out evidence of insurance. Conversely, when the
plaintiff's attorney elicits the fact of insurance on cross-examina-
tion, he should be held to a lower standard of accountability. Cases
supportive of a varying standard of care include Ernest Yeager &
Sons v. Howell.50 During the course of this personal-injury
52. 49 Ariz. 295, 66 P.2d 246 (1937).
53. Id. at 303, 66 P.2d at 249.
54. See Brown v. Walter, 62 F.2d 798, 799 (2d Cir. 1933); Young v. Carter,
121 Ga. App. 191, 193, 173 S.E.2d 259, 260 (1970) (concurring opinion).
55. 93 Ariz. at 65, 378 P.2d at 744.
56. 234 So. 2d 899 (Miss. 1970).
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trial, an employee of the defendant referred to the defendant's in-
surance in the following exchange:
Q. Did you make any investigation to determine why she [the
plaintiff] fell?
A. No, I did not, but the doctor, we got insurance, and my job is
to call a doctor and to get her to a doctor, I mean it [sic]
wasn't any point in me trying to find out.
57
In upholding the denial of the defendant's motion for a new trial,
the Mississippi supreme court cited the rule that where an attorney
asks a question that calls for admissible evidence, the fact that the
witness gives an unresponsive or inadvertent answer containing a
reference to insurance will not be grounds for ordering a new trial.
In approving of the rule the court stated, "This rule is necessary;
otherwise, every defendant who desired a new trial might obtain
it by simply saying 'we got insurance.' "58 Yeager and similar
decisions 9 have suggested that the responsibility for insuring that
the defendant's witnesses do not bring up the forbidden topic rests
with defense counsel, not with the plaintiff's attorney. Thus, where
the plaintiff's attorney's question calls for a proper response, no
mistrial should be granted.60  Where, however, the plaintiff's at-
torney improperly cross-examines the defense witness with the
obvious intent to disclose the existence of the defendant's insurance,
a different result must obtain.
Lubbock Bus Co. v. Pearson6 ' is an excellent example of such an
impermissible intent.62 In Lubbock, the defendant's bus ran into and
injured the plaintiff. On cross-examination of the bus driver, who
was not made a party to the case, the plaintiff's attorney repeatedly
harangued the driver as to his duty to pay for the plaintiff's
damages, and elicited the following testimony:
Q. Well, what is your testimony now? Do you say that you said
that over there in Kyle Rotesseau's [the insurance adjuster]
office or don't you say it?
A. I don't believe that I said I was responsible for it and that I
was supposed to pay for it because the insurance takes care of
that.
Q. The What?
A. The insurance takes care of that.63
57. Id. at 901.
58. Id.
59. E.g., Muehlebach v. Mercer Mortuary & Chapel, Inc., 93 Ariz. 60, 378
P.2d 741 (1963).
60. See id. at 66, 378 P.2d at 744.
61. 266 S.W.2d 439 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953).
62. See also Colqueth v. Williams, 264 Ala. 214, 86 So. 2d 381 (1956).
63. 266 S.W.2d at 445.
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In determining whether or not the defendant's witness voluntarily
mentioned insurance, and whether such information was brought
to the jury's attention through the fault of the plaintiff's attorney,
the appellate court looked at the entire record. In making its
determination, the court stressed the following elements: the
witness was not adroit, while the attorney was; the bus driver was
not joined as a defendant; the plaintiff's attorney knew that the
defendant had insurance; and the attorney repeatedly harangued
the witness as to his duty to pay for the plaintiff's damages. In
finding that the witness did not volunteer the reference to in-
surance and that the plaintiff's attorney was trying to prejudice the
defendant's case, the court stated:
In repeatedly haranguing the bus driver . .. as to his duty to
pay for the plaintiff's damage he could but expect to finally put the
driver on the defensive and the only logical answer that appellee's
attorney could expect from the driver under his gruelling ex-
amination ... was the answer given by the driver that he did not
believe he was under the duty to fix appellee's car because the in-
surance company was supposed to fix it.64
In cases where the plaintiff's attorney has grilled the defense wit-
ness as was done in Lubbock, it is clear that the only remedy is to
declare a mistrial.
Safeguards to prevent the improper introduction of evidence of
insurance include, in addition to the threat of mistrial, the court's
power, upon the defendant's request, to strike the objectionable
testimony and admonish the jury to totally disregard it.
This exception occurs with much less frequency where the de-
fense attorney, on cross-examination of the plaintiff's witness, dis-
closes the existence of the defendant's insurance. Here, no mistrial
should result if it appears that the witness's disclosure was unin-
tentional. This rule should apply with greater force where the dis-
closure is attributable, at least in part, to the defense's persistent
questioning. 5
This exception is also pertinent where the defense attorney
elicits the defendant's insurance coverage from one of his own wit-
nesses.66 As discussed above, each attorney has the burden of pre-
paring his own witnesses, and no mistrial should be declared where
neither the plaintiff nor his attorney had any part in bringing the
fact of the defendant's coverage before the jury.
67
64. Id. at 447.
65. See Burnett v. Caho, 7 il. App. 3d 266, 273, 285 N.E.2d 619, 625
(1972).
66. See Norton v. Ewaskio, 241 S.C. 257, 129 S.E.2d 517 (1963).
67. Vollington v. Southern Paving Constr. Co., 166 S.C. 448, 452, 165 S.E.
184, 186 (1932).
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The Nebraska supreme court does not appear to have considered
any cases similar to those above. However, it has dealt with two
somewhat analogous cases. In Segebart v. Gregory,68 the court was
faced with a situation in which a witness for the defendant volun-
teered the fact that the plaintiff was insured. Upon motion by the
plaintiff, the court had the statement stricken, and admonished
the jury. After the jury found for the defendant, the plaintiff
moved for a mistrial. The Supreme Court of Nebraska upheld the
denial of the delinquent motion for mistrial, stating that "it was
incumbent upon the plaintiff to make such objection and motion
at that time."69 From the court's discussion, it is not clear whether
its decision rested upon an estoppel or waiver theory, or whether
it rested upon a belief that the trial court cured the irrelevant
reference to insurance by striking it and admonishing the jury. It
is submitted that either theory is proper where it is the plaintiff's
and not the defendant's coverage that is revealed.
A second case, Litwiller v. Graff,70 involved codefendants who,
upon cross-examination of each other, elicited the fact of one
another's liability insurance. The court held that under these
peculiar circumstances no mistrial could be granted upon the de-
fendant's motions, because the plaintiff was without fault, and had
in fact moved to strike the irrelevant statements,
Nebraska case law would seem to be in accord with the above
proposals. These general principles hold the attorney to a much
higher standard in keeping evidence of insurance out when he is
examining his own witnesses. Conversely, when counsel is ex-
amining an adverse witness, he should bear little, if any, respon-
sibility for that witness's responses to questions asked in good faith.
VI. WHEN COUNSEL IN GOOD FAITH ON VOIR DIRE
QUESTIONS PROSPECTIVE JURORS WITH RESPECT
TO THEIR INTEREST IN INSURANCE COMPANIES
When counsel, in good faith, questions prospective jurors about
their relationships with insurance companies, courts often recognize
an exception to the general rule of nondisclosure. One court has
stated that the purpose of voir dire "is to enable the court and
counsel to select as fair and impartial a jury as possible,"'71 and has
suggested that counsel not only has the right to inquire if a juror
68. 160 Neb. 64, 69 N.W.2d 315 (1955).
69. Id. at 73, 69 N.W.2d at 321.
70. 124 Neb. 460, 246 N.W. 922 (1933).
71. Oglesby v. Conger, 31 Colo. App. 504, 506, 507 P.2d 883, 885 (1972).
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has any relationship with the defendant's insurance company, but
may, if such a relationship is disclosed, go further and inquire into
the nature of it.72 In this area, the courts must strike a balance
between the plaintiff's interest in having an impartial jury, and
the defendant's interest in preventing insurance from distracting
the jury.78 If the purpose of the interrogation, however, is to in-
form the jurors of the existence of the defendant's insurance cover-
age, such questions constitute reversible error.7 4
Courts often look at the record to determine if the plaintiff's
attorney willfully, or persistently, attempted to impress upon the
jury the fact of the defendant's insurance coverage.7 5 If no insur-
ance is in fact involved, then any interrogation of jurors that tends
to create a suspicion in their minds of the defendant's coverage
amounts to a lack of good faith.7 6 Likewise, some courts hold that
if there is no reasonable probability of any of the jurors being in-
terested in the company, then the inquiry should not be made.77
This determination of good faith is to be made by the trial court in
its sound discretion. In the absence of an abuse of discretion, the
trial court's ruling will not be disturbed.78
Not all courts, however, view the presence or absence of the
plaintiff's counsel's good faith as determinative. Thus, in Green v.
Ligon,7 9 a Texas court stated:
It makes little difference as to the good faith of counsel in
asking the question for the purpose of obtaining needed informa-
tion-the result and effect of the question were the same as if he
had made the inquiry for the deliberate purpose of accomplishing
the end that it obviously brought.8o
This approach seems harsh, particularly where the evidence does
not show that the plaintiff's attorney attempted to highlight the
fact of the defendant's liability insurance. As the Iowa supreme
court recognized:
72. Id. at 507, 507 P.2d at 885.
73. Robinson v. Faulkner, 163 Conn. 365, 375, 306 A.2d 857, 863 (1972).
74. Montanick v. McMillan, 225 Iowa 442, 450, 280 N.W. 608, 612 (1938);
see A. J. Miller Trucking Co. v. Wood, 474 S.W.2d 763, 766 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1972).
75. Anderson v. City of Council Bluffs, 195 N.W.2d 373, 377 (Iowa 1972);
Montanick v. McMillan, 225 Iowa 442, 450, 280 N.W. 608, 612 (1938).
76. Wheeler v. Rudek, 397 Ill. 438, 74 N.E.2d 601 (1947); Bennett v.
Cauble, 167 S.W.2d 959 (Mo. Ct. App. 1943).
77. Ewing-von Allmen Dairy Co. v. Godwin, 304 Ky. 161, 163, 200 S.W.
2d 103, 104 (1947); Wheeler v. Rudek, 397 fll. 438, 442, 74 N.E.2d 601,
603 (1947).
78. Meadors v. Gregory, 484 S.W.2d 860, 863 (Ky. 1972); Hays v. Proctor,
404 S.W.2d 756, 760 (Mo. Ct. App. 1966).
79. 190 S.W.2d 742 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945).
80. Id. at 748.
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[I]f a litigant were denied the right to propound the question asked
the jurors [about their interest in a certain insurance company]
.... ,he might be compelled to accept a juror who is a stockholder
in an insurance company, and probably the very one having de-
fendant's liability insured.8 '
Assuming that the plaintiff may inquire as to prosepective
jurors' interests in insurance companies, the question is, "What is
the permissible form of inquiry?" The Oklahoma supreme court in
Safeway Cab Service Co. v. Minor,8 2 suggested the following
method:
[I]f a juror is asked if he owns stock in any corporation or is em-
ployed by one, and answers in the negative, further questions are
unnecessary. If the juror answers in the affirmative, inquiry as
to the type of corporation is proper. If the answer discloses that it
is a corporation other than one engaged in insurance business,
further questions are unnecessary. If the answer discloses that
it is an insurance corporation, then pertinent and specific questions
are proper in order to establish the prospective jurors' partiality,
etc.88
This method adequately protects the interests of both parties. It
allows the plaintiff the opportunity to learn of the jurors' interest
in insurance without unduly stressing it when such an interest is
present. When an interest is not present, the mention of insurance
will not be made, and the defendant will in no way be prejudiced.
When a juror does have an interest in the insurance company, the
plaintiff's voir dire is structured in such a manner as to minimize
its prejudicial effect, and thus to render a new trial unnecessary.
Another line of cases, while allowing questions on insurance
without the preliminary questions used in Minor, would limit them
to the subject of the veniremen's connections to insurance com-
panies in general. Thus, in Elliot v. Paul,8 4 the Arkansas supreme
court held that the following reference to a particular insurance
company was reversible error: "Do any of you know Mr. Louis
Logan with the People's Indemnity Insurance Company?"8' 5 The
basis for the objection appeared to be that the question suggested
the defendant's insurance coverage more strongly than a mere
reference to insurance companies in general. Other courts do not
agree with this distinction, and would allow the plaintiff to in-
terrogate the prospective jurors as to their interest in the named
company defending the case.88
81. Montanick v. McMillan, 225 Iowa 442, 450, 280 N.W. 608, 612 (1938).
82. 180 Okla. 448, 70 P.2d 76 (1937).
83. Id. at 449, 70 P.2d at 78.
84. 235 Ark. 98, 357 S.W.2d 292 (1962).
85. Id. at 99, 357 S.W.2d at 293.
86. Cain v. Wilson, 506 P.2d 1240 (Colo. Ct. App. 1973); Anderson v. City
of Council Bluffs, 195 N.W.2d 373 (Iowa 1972).
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The rule allowing inquiries as to the jurors' interest in a partic-
ular named insurance company has been extended by some courts
to allow the plaintiff to ask the question of each juror individually
if the question could be asked of the jury collectively. 7 This ex-
tension unjustifiably prejudices the defendant's case by continually
reinforcing the jury's suspicion not only that is the defendant in-
sured, but that he is insured by a particular company. If the safe-
guards suggested in Minor8 are not followed, it seems preferable to
ask the jurors collectively, rather than individually, if they have
any insurance connections. Those jurors so indicating could then
be questioned as to the nature of that interest. This would result
in less emphasis on the question of insurance, especially where only
one or two members of the prospective jury have insurance con-
nections.
There is one important caveat to remember in this area. Where
the plaintiff improperly introduces insurance into the case, the jury
may get an instruction from the court that tends to indicate that the
defendant has no insurance. 89 This corrective measure may very
well swing the pendulum of prejudice in the defendant's favor.
The plaintiff, having instigated the matter, has little ground for
objection.
Preliminary to voir dire, it would be desirable for plaintiff's
counsel to set forth, in an affidavit, facts showing a reasonable
probability of jurors' interests in insurance companies. In some
jurisdictions, however, this would be impossible, because the at-
torneys do not learn of the jury panelists' names in time to make
the necessary investigations. Assuming that it would be possible
to make the necessary investigations prior to voir dire, the court
should permit those jurors indicating an interest in insurance to be
examined in some detail so that the exact nature of that interest may
be disclosed.
The Nebraska law on this exception appears to be quite sparce.
In Bergendahl v. Rabeler,90 the plaintiff's counsel, on voir dire,
asked each prospective juror several questions as to whether or
not he was a policyholder, stockholder or agent of State Farm In-
surance. The Nebraska supreme court strongly disapproved of this
questioning. The court acknowledged that this type of questioning
may at times be valid, but an unrestricted right to so examine jurors
87. Davis v. Fortino & Jackson Chevrolet Co., 32 Colo. App. 222, 225, 510
P.2d 1376, 1378 (1973).
88. See p. 168 supra.
89. Bertram v. Harris, 423 P.2d 909, 918 (Alas. 1967).
90. 131 Neb. 538, 268 N.W. 459 (1936).
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would "allow the unscrupulous and unethical to use it under a
false guise for a purpose that no ethical lawyer would desire to
attain.""' This strong condemnation is no doubt largely responsible
for the lack of litigation in this area in Nebraska.
Bergendahi held that on voir dire, counsel scrupulously should
avoid any reference to insurance. With respect to this rule, the
court further stated:
A violation of such rule is error prejudicial to the party offended,
unless the circumstances of the entire case affirmatively show
lack of prejudice thereby or affirmatively show that such informa-
tion was a necessary incident to securing information that is needed
for use in making challenges and that reasonably could not other-
wise be secured. To ask of the juror whether or not he is an
agent of or stockholder in any corporation and, if he is either, to
make inquiry of him as to the kind of corporation to which he bears
such relation will usually give all the information needed without
use of the word "insurance."92
Thus, in this area, it is clear that Nebraska has adopted the more
desirable Minor procedure set out above. This procedure, when
followed, adequately protects the interests of both parties without
prejudicing either.93
VII. MISCELLANEOUS EXCEPTIONS
There are a number of miscellaneous exceptions by which the
plaintiff may, either directly or indirectly, show the existence of
the defendant's liability insurance coverage.94 Below are a few
examples.
Under one exception, if the defendant injects the fact of in-
surance into evidence, he may not complain if the plaintiff also
refers to insurance.9 5 It is not always necessary for the defendant
to make the first reference to his insurance in order to bring this
exception into play.96 A mistrial may, however, be warranted
where the plaintiff's counsel repeatedly and calculatedly tries to
elicit further references to insurance, when his purpose in so doing
is to prejudice the jury.
9 7
91. Id. at 543, 268 N.W. at 461.
92. Id. at 544, 268 N.W. at 462.
93. A second Nebraska case dealing with voir dire involved a juror's
mention of insurance, which, when clarified, showed that the juror
was referring to life insurance, and not liability insurance. That being
the case, no prejudice was found. See Nama v. Shada, 150 Neb. 362,
367, 34 N.W.2d 650, 653 (1948).
94. See Annot., supra note 8, §§ 5-11, 13, 14.
95. Chilcutt v. Keating, 220 Miss. 545, 551, 71 So. 2d 472, 475 (1954).
96. See id.
97. Fitzgerald v. Brown, 86 Ill. App. 2d 289, 294, 230 N.E.2d 80, 83 (1967).
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A document that is otherwise admissible may not be rendered
inadmissible merely because it contains an incidental reference to
insurance, unless the defendant comes forward and shows that pre-
judice will result. Thus, in a Pennsylvania personal injury case, it
was held that the sending of a lease, containing references to lia-
biity insurance, to the jury room did not warrant a mistrial absent
a showing of prejudice. 98 At times, courts will allow documentary
evidence referring to insurance to be viewed by the jurors if the
reference is excised,99 or if the jury is instructed to consider it only
for the purpose for which it is relevant. 00
Another exception to the rule of nondisclosure may be found
when insurance coverage is compulsory. Thus, in Scott v. Wells,'
where the defendant was the owner of a taxicab, the court stated
that the nondisclosure rule was inapplicable because the insurance
was required by statute, and the insurer could be joined in the
action. Other courts have been unwilling to recognize this ex-
ception, especially where the plaintiff's reference to insurance is
made in a highly prejudicial manner. 0 2
When the plaintiff manages to inject the fact of insurance with-
out expressly mentioning it, another exception to the nondisclosure
rule arises. Thus it has been held that no declaration of mistrial
was in order where the plaintiff told the jury that the "defendant
wouldn't have to pay for it," and where the trial court had ad-
monished the jury not to consider the statement and no further
ruling was requested. 0 3 However, where the reference to in-
surance becomes too blatant, courts may declare mistrials. Where
plaintiff's counsel, in referring to the defendant, stated, "She's in
good hands, gentlemen,"' 0 4 or "the verdict will not personally punish
the defendants"' 0 5 reversible error has been found. Though there
has been little litigation in this area in Nebraska, the Nebraska
supreme court has held similar references to insurance to be
reversible error'10 6
Other miscellaneous exceptions include cases where the de-
fendant is a large corporation and hence just as vulnerable to a
98. Dorsic v. Kurtin, 19 Cal. App. 3d 226, 235, 96 Cal. Rptr. 528, 535 (2d
Dist. 1971).
99. Capozi v. Hearst Publishing Co., 371 Pa. 503, 518, 92 A.2d 177, 184
(1952).
100. Olson v. Sharpe, 36 Tenn. App. 557, 571, 259 S.W.2d 867, 873 (1953).
101. 214 S.C. 511, 53 S.E.2d 400 (1949).
102. See Nicholson v. Garris, 418 Pa. 146, 210 A.2d 164 (1965).
103. Clark v. Hudson, 265 Ala. 630, 634, 93 So. 2d 138, 141 (1956).
104. Lovin v. Stanley, 493 S.W.2d 725, 727 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1973).
105. Purdes v. Merrill, 268 Minn. 129, 128 N.W.2d 164 (1964).
106. See Sandomierski v. Fixemer, 163 Neb. 716, 720, 81 N.W.2d 142, 146
(1957).
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big damage award as the insurance company.'0" The courts may
reason that a reference to insurance cannot harm the insurer, be-
cause the jury is already prejudiced against the defendant due to
its large size. Bench trials'08 or cases where the references to in-
surance can be cured by proper instruction' 9 may give rise to other
exceptions to the nondisclosure rule.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The general rule of nondisclosure of defendant's liability in-
surance is subject to numerous exceptions. Many questions relat-
ing to those exceptions may be answered by looking to two basic
watchwords: "relevance" and "prejudice." Where the fact of in-
surance is not relevant to any disputed issue, it may not be shown.
Where the fact of insurance is relevant, it may be shown for the
limited purpose of proving the disputed issue, if its relevance out-
weighs its prejudicial effect. One additional element that the
courts refer to is the good faith of counsel. Where a lack of good
faith is found, the remedy is generally a mistrial.
In summary, the existence of defendant's liability insurance may
be proved if it tends to resolve a disputed issue, or if it is relevant
to the credibility of a witness. However, with regard to the latter,
the interests of the plaintiff are satisfied if he is limited to showing
that the witness is employed on behalf of the defendant without
going beyond and showing that the witness is employed by a
named insurance company. The defendant's liability insurance may
also be shown if it is an integral part of an admission or if a
witness unresponsively volunteers it in reply to a proper question.
Similarly, in addition to the numerous miscellaneous exceptions,
several jurisdictions allow plaintiff's counsel to question prospective
jurors on voir dire relative to their insurance connections, provided
that counsel is acting in good faith. Other jurisdictions, in better-
reasoned opinions, do not permit plaintiff's counsel to mention the
word "insurance" without taking a cautious step-by-step approach
to reveal that a juror in fact has a close relationship with an in-
surance company. This approach is the better approach because
it does not give plaintiff's counsel an opportunity to bring up the
forbidden topic unless one or more jurors actually have a close
relationship with an insurance company.
Robert G. Pahike '76
107. See Tuttle v. Pacific Intermountain Express Co., 121 Utah 420, 431,
242 P.2d 764, 770 (1952).
108. See, e.g., Rutherford v. Bentz, 345 Ill. App. 532, 539, 104 N.E.2d 343,
347 (1952).
109. See Wagnon v. Patterson, 260 Ala. 297, 307, 70 So. 2d 244, 253 (1954).
